Sciences, Philosophie, Histoire – UMR 7219, laboratoire SPHERE

• Fedor BENEVICH (University of Edinburgh)
  Between Meaning and Reference : Maʿānī in Post-Avicennan Philosophy
  In my presentation, I will explore two philosophical issues discussed in post-Avicennan philosophy with respect to the notion of maʿnā : 1) the logical structure of predication and 2) the reality of divine attributes. I will argue that the predominant understanding of maʿnā in post-Avicennan tradition (probably developed under the influence of Avicennan conceptualist essentialism) is of an intensional object. Intensional objects are meanings of words that exist in the real world outside our minds without being distinct objects, unlike referents. So, speaking of the logical structure of predication, post-Avicennans argue that predication implies the identity of the external referent without the identity of the maʿnā and the ḥaqīqa of the subject and the predicate. Likewise, the discussion of the divine attributes amounts to the question whether the presence of distinct intensional objects (maʿānī) next to the divine essence implies that there is more than one referent in our discourse of God. Al-Sāwī, Abū l-Barakāt, Ibn al-Malāḥimī and al-Šahrastānī are among the authors discussed in my presentation.

• Lucie TARDY (Paris 1)
  The ṣifāt maʿnawiyya in al-Juwaynī’s Kitāb al-Irshād
  5he Ashʿarī theologian al-Juwaynī draws a distinction between two types of divine attributes (ṣifāt) : the “attributes of self” (ṣifāt nafsiyya) and the “qualifying attributes” (ṣifāt maʿnawiyya). While the first type of ṣifāt is God’s, in and of Himself, the attributes maʿnawiyya are identified with characteristics (aḥkām) caused by maʿānī which inhere in the essence of God. Thus, ‘being willing’ or ‘knowing’ are characteristic properties that indicate the existence, within God, of their corresponding maʿānī (the maʿnā of Will, the maʿnā of Knowledge).
  What does the concept of maʿnā, in this context, refer to ? The aim of this presentation is to give a clearer account of this concept, given that the theological context – the problem of God’s attributes– engage both the issue of attribution in its epistemological dimension and some of the most singular features of Juwaynī’s ontology.
  Two main questions will be discussed. First, we will try to clarify the causal relation existing between the maʿānī and their corresponding ṣifāt (ṣifāt maʿnawiyya) or grounded (muʿallal) modes (aḥwāl). Second, we will focus on the ontological status of the maʿnā inhering in God’s essence. How should the existence of an entitative causative factor be understood in God ? This last problem is among the most difficult of Juwaynī’s theology, since it requires to be solved to identify whether or not these maʿānī are to be conceived as real and existing entities.

• Beata SHEYHATOVITCH (Tel Aviv University)
  When meanings have gender and number
  he term maʿnā lit. ‘meaning’ is very important and frequent in various Islamic disciplines. Maʿnā, usually used as an opposite of lafẓ ‘(linguistic) form/expression’, is employed in many diverse contexts and is found with a variety of referents. It may refer, for instance, to the speaker’s intention, the word’s referent, the word/phrase/sentence that are semantically equivalent to the given ones, the constituent’s function, the object’s attribute, etc. Alexander Key claims that the interpretation of “mental content” covers this wide range of uses.
  Muslim scholars view the purpose of the language as expressing meanings/intentions. However, they recognize that linguistic expressions do not always stand in one-to-one correspondence to meanings : synonyms (kalimāt mutarādifa) are viewed (by some scholars) as different expressions with the same meaning, homonyms (kalimāt muštaraka) are viewed as expressions that have several meanings ; certain meanings are perceived as “being included” (mutaḍammana) in the expression or “being entailed” (mustalzama) by it.
  In my talk I will focus on cases in which the idea of mismatches between the meaning and the expression is employed in technical grammatical discussions. Grammarians may say of a certain constituent that the grammatical properties of its meaning differ from the grammatical properties of its expression (e.g., the expression may be in the singular whereas its meaning is in the dual/plural), or a certain grammatical construction may be said to exist on the expression-level but not on the meaning-level (e.g., improper annexation is called ʾiḍāfa lafẓiyya lit. ‘formal annexation’ because it is viewed as existing only on the expression-level). In these contexts, meaning is presented as a constituent/phrase equivalent to the produced one, which is present in the speaker’s mind and can explain certain properties of the produced constituent/phrase. In some cases speakers can choose whether they make other speech constituents agree with the expression-level (al-ḥaml ʿalā al-lafẓ) or with the meaning-level (al-ḥaml ʿalā al-maʿnā).

• David WIRMER (Universität zu Köln)
  ‘Intermediate Spiritual Forms’ and Their Place in Ibn Bāǧǧa’s Theory of Maʿnā
  Although Ibn Bāǧǧa sometimes defines maʿnā as “form separated from matter” (ṣūra munfarida ʿan al-mādda), it can be shown that this thesis does neither imply the existence of separate forms or ‘ideas,’ nor does it even presuppose the possibility of a purely eidetic consideration of formal content, independent from its logical and physical implications, as it is famously claimed by Ibn Sīnā. Rather, Ibn Bāǧǧa develops the concept of maʿnā on the basis of a complex theory of relations that allows him to conceive of different degrees of separateness of a form (or maʿnā)―a separation, however, which never becomes total and thus allows to explain the peculiar feature of perception and intellection, i.e. that perception is of or about something and, hence, at the same time somehow identical with it and different from it.
  In his Governance of the Solitary (Tadbīr al-mutawaḥḥid) Ibn Bāǧǧa discusses the different relationships that perceived and intellected forms entertain with the real-world objects whose forms they are. Without, here, employing the term ‘maʿnā,’ these reflections build on and further develop Ibn Bāǧǧa’s earlier remarks on maʿnā in several of his commentaries and treatises, and in particular in his Kitāb al-nafs. The new term, used throughout the Governance, is that of “spiritual forms” (ṣuwar rūḥāniyya). While this newly fashioned concept goes beyond the epistemological considerations bound up with the notion of maʿnā and deploys its full meaning only in the practical (political) context, it does contribute one peculiar aspect to the epistemological study. For Ibn Bāǧǧa, here, introduces “intermediate spiritual forms” (ṣuwar rūḥāniyya mutawassiṭa) that are not only said to entertain a relationship with the real-world objects different from both that of perception and intellection, but that are also claimed to be the very basis of intellection proper. In my paper I will try to elucidate the concept of “intermediate spiritual forms” by showing how it integrates into Ibn Bāǧǧa’s general theory of maʿnā.
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Matinée

• 10:00 - 11:00 Silvia DI DONATO (CNRS, SPHere)
  Sur la tradition hébraïque de la Damima d’Averroès

• 11:15 - 12:15 Warren ZEEV HARVEY (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
  Hasdai Crescas and the possible influence of Averroes’ Damima

Après-midi

• 14:00 - 15:00 Yahuda HALPER (Bar-Ilan University)
  Damima and Dialectic in Averroes and the Hebrew Tradition

• 15:00 - 16:00 David WIRMER (Universität zu Köln)
  Gersonides’ Ambiguous Reading of Maimonides’ Stance on Divine Knowledge

• 16:00 - 17:00 Roberto GATTI (Ch. indépendant)
  ‘Neither universal nor particular’ : Gersonides on Averroes’ statement about God’s knowledge

Matinée – présidence : Aurélien Robert (CNRS, SPHere)

• 9:00 - 10:00 Giora HON (University of Haifa)
  A Philosophy of Error in Historical Context

• 10:00 - 11:00 Maria SOROKINA (IRHT, CNRS)
  Erreur des sens, erreurs du calcul. A propos d’un argument dans la théorie des nombres.

11:00 - 11:15 pause café

• 11:15 - 12:15 Matthieu HUSSON (CNRS/Observatoire de Paris-PSL, Projet ERC « ALFA »)
  Tables et instruments planétaires : deux régimes d’erreurs complémentaires

Après-midi – présidence : Sabine Rommevaux (CNRS, SPHere)

• 14:00 - 15:00 A. CALVET
  L’erreur en terres alchimiques : entre défense et expérience

• 15:00 - 16:00 Elena BALTUTA (Babes-Bolyai Univ., Cluj-Napoca)
  Eadem est scientia oppositorum : The Use of Errors in the Science of Perspectiva

16:00 - 16:15 pause

• 16:15 - 17:15 Joël CHANDELIER (Univ. Paris 8)
  Doser les médicaments, se tromper et corriger (début XIVe siècle)

• 17:15 - 17:30 : Mots de conclusion

PRÉSENTATION
Erreur et fausseté sont deux notions proches, qui témoignent toutes deux de l’inadéquation entre la réalité et le discours (écrit, oral, calculé, dessiné) qui porte sur elle. La distinction entre ces deux notions existe pourtant, notamment dans la mesure où la fausseté tient à l’immuabilité tandis que l’erreur s’inscrit par définition dans une temporalité. En effet, elle se fait jour à partir du moment où elle est anticipée (reconnue comme un contenu approximatif, amendable, soumis à réélaborations ultérieures) ou, plus simplement, lorsqu’elle est corrigée et donc définie par rapport à un passé.
On ne compte plus les mentions, dans les propos introductifs des textes du Moyen Âge, d’une expression qui se ferait « sub correctione aliorum », laissant entendre par là, au-delà d’une humilité de façade, la réalité d’une conception de savoirs humains qui s’élaboreraient collectivement, au long du temps, par raffinements successifs. L’errance serait le lot de l’humain aux prises avec son désir de connaissance, et la correction une nécessité morale en plus de gnoséologique.
Les marques de l’erreur peuvent en effet être des déclarations explicites, de la part des auteurs eux-mêmes offrant leur travail à des développements ultérieurs ou bien corrigeant ou réprouvant des propos antérieurs (les leurs ou ceux des autres) dans le cadre de débats doctrinaux.

C’est à la conception de l’erreur, envisagée dans son fondement étymologique comme un « errement », un cheminement autour du territoire de la vérité qui creuse parfois durablement de nouvelles voies, que souhaite se consacrer cette journée d’études.
Où situer la limite entre des thèses considérées comme erronées et à écarter, et des déclarations humblement considérer comme imparfaites ? Quelle place la science médiévale latine faisait-elle à contenus approximatifs mais utilisables efficacement ? Comment traquer et attester d’une erreur ? Quelles formes de remédiations à l’erreur peuvent-elles envisagées : corrections ponctuelles ou réformes radicales ?

Les productions scientifiques (philosophie naturelle, médecine, astronomie…) de la fin du Moyen Âge latin, qu’il s’agisse de textes et de leurs annotations marginales, de listes de valeurs numériques ou de diagrammes, constituent un observatoire particulièrement pertinent pour remarquer les différents régimes de l’erreur et de la correction, révélant ainsi les conceptions épistémologiques des auteurs, et la façon dont ils pensent la connaissance dans son rapport à la temporalité et au travail collectif.

Matinée

• 9:15 - 9:30 Accueil des participants et présentation de la journée d’étude

• 9:30 - 10:30 Marwan RASHED (Sorbonne Université, Centre Léon Robin)
  L’aristotélisme d’Abū al-Barakāt al-Baġdādī – grâce au kalām, contre Avicenne, mieux qu’Aristote

• 10:30 - 11:30 Miriam ROGASCH (Universität zu Köln & Université Paris 1)
  Avicenna and the Ash‘arite Understanding of Causality

• 11:30 - 11:45 pause café

• 11:45 - 12:45 Fedor BENEVICH (University of Edinburgh)
  Avicenna and the Epistemology of Kalām

Après-midi

• 14:30 - 15:30 Ilyas HARIFI (SPHere-CNRS)
  L’aporie de la théorie avicennienne de l’essence divine

• 15:30 - 16:30 Damien JANOS (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität)
  Essence and Unity in Avicenna and the Bahshamites

• 16:30 - 17:00 Discussion finale

• Julie BRUMBERG-CHAUMONT (CNRS, PSL/SNRS/LEM, Paris)
  Principes de la démonstration et prémisses de l’argumentation : une approche disputationnelle de la démonstration
  La contribution proposée souhaite prendre en compte, outre les théories de la démonstration, les pratiques médiévales de la démonstration, ainsi que les théories des maîtres à propos de ces pratiques, au moment où les Seconds analytiques s’imposent pour penser la méthode de la science, le 13e siècle. Un sujet de perplexité peut alors être le peu de succès littéraire de la forme axiomatique dans les écrits scientifiques de la période, lequel suggère que la redécouverte systématique du traité aristotélicien n’a rien changé à la trajectoire disputationnelle de la pratique médiévale de la science. Un autre sujet d’interrogation peut être le fait que la contradiction professée par Aristote entre démonstration et dispute ne semble pas avoir conduit nos maîtres à craindre qu’il pourrait y voir un hiatus ou une tension irrémédiable entre leur théorie (axiomatique) et leur pratique (disputationnelle) de la science. Nous proposons différentes hypothèses pour expliquer ces phénomènes, avec un accent particulier sur la question des principes. Nous évoquerons en particulier l’existence d’un flottement à l’intérieur du modèle déductif, entre une axiomatique décrite (et non pratiquée) par Aristote et pratiquée (et non théorisée) par Euclide et une approche distincte, « théorématique », des principes, incarnée par des textes extrêmement influents, comme le Liber de causis — ou encore une présentation disputationnelle des principes de la démonstration, comme dans le De hebdomadibus. Un autre aspect de la question sera la possibilité de décrire une approche dialectisée (et non dialectique) de la question des principes de la démonstration et de la science en général (notamment lisible dans Anal Po II, 2, 71a35-b5). Celle-ci prend place dans le cadre d’une interprétation médiévale générale où les disputes sont toutes ou bien dialectiques « au service de la science » ou bien didactiques/scientifiques, et même « démonstratives », avec la possibilité d’un répondant/élève coopératif ou non coopératif (notamment lisible dans Anal Po I, 10). Nous proposons enfin de repérer l’invention à cette époque d’une forme littéraire scientifique nouvelle, la dispute scientifique axiomatisée ou quasi-axiomatisée.

• Vincenzo DE RISI (CNRS, SPHere & Max-Plank-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte)
  The Provability of Axioms. Genesis and Downfall of a Scholastic Theory
  The talk explores the theory of the principles of demonstration in mathematics. During the Middle Ages, the thesis that axioms can be proved from the definitions of the terms used was first advanced. This theory had an important early modern reception, and was instrumental in the epistemology of mathematics until the 18th century. This theory was generally attributed to Aristotle, but was in fact the outcome of a Medieval hybridization of Aristotelian theories, Neoplatonic theories, and mathematical reflections. Greek commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics in late antiquity, and their influence on the early Latin commentaries of the thirteenth century, as well as medieval commentaries on Euclid’s Elements, will be considered in an attempt to explain the genesis and fortunes of the idea that the principles of mathematics are all provable.

• Graziana CIOLA (Radboud University, Nijmegen)
  Showing, Proving, Demonstrating : Rational and Scientific Argumentation in 14th century Nominalist Logic after Buridan
  The contributions of 14th century “Nominalism” to the history of logic and scientific thought are renowned, impactful and long-lasting. Nonetheless, 14th century “Nominalism” itself is far from being a homogeneous and unchanging philosophical movement, clearly set in its semantical, logical and scientific tenets. For instance, even taking a passing look at relatively well known key figures like William of Ockham and John Buridan, it is easy to spot major differences in their semantics, their accounts of logical consequence, and their views of scientific demonstration, Against this background, in this talk I will explore some eclectic developments in nominalist logic after Buridan, with particular regard to Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen. I will especially focus on how a generally shared semantic principle – the so called “Ockhamist pointing criterion” of reference – plays a role in accounts of reference, valid inference and sound demonstration that can be subtly but profoundly divergent.

• Stephen CLUCAS (Birbeck College, University of London)
  Thomas Hobbes, Joachim Jungius, and the status of the axiom
  Famously, Thomas Hobbes declared in Book VIII of his De corpore (1655) that Euclid’s axioms are not indemonstrable and therefore could not be considered to have the same status as a first principle in a ‘scientific’ demonstration. In this paper I will examine the status of the axiom in the works of Hobbes and in the logical and natural philosophical writings of his near-contemporary, the German philosopher Joachim Jungius (1587-1657). Through this comparative study I aim to highlight some of the ambiguities surrounding the role of the axiom in mathematical and philosophical demonstration in mid-seventeenth century Europe.

Matinée

• 9:30 Introduction

• 9:45 - 10:45 Philippe DEBROISE (SPHere)
  Nicole Oresme et la perfection des espèces : un simple problème métrique ?

• pause

• 11:15 - 12:15 Daniel A. DI LISCIA (Ludwig-Maximilians Universität München)
  Jacob of Naples’ Treatise on the Perfection of Species

Après-midi

• 14:00 - 15:00 Andrea NANNINI
  Divine ideas, multiplicity and replicatio unitatis divinae : John of Ripa’s de perfectione specierum

• pause

• 15:30 - 16:30 Sylvain ROUDAUT (Stockholm University)
  An original philosophical synthesis : Paul of Venice’s theory of the perfection of species

• 16:30 Conclusion

RÉSUMÉS